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Footnotes 
1. 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).
2. Justice at Stake is a nonpartisan national partnership working to
keep courts fair and impartial.  Partner organizations include the
American Bar Association, the Constitution Project, the League of
Women Voters, and the National Center for State Courts, as well
as various state-specific organizations.  For more information
consult the Justice at Stake website at www.justiceatstake.org.
3. In addition to citing the two questions asked of the public used in
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, the Brennan Center brief
also reported on three questions from the judges’ survey in sup-
port of the claim that “[m]any judges are acutely aware of the role
of money in judicial elections.”  Brief for the Brennan Center for
Justice at New York University School of Law as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 16, Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002) (No. 01-1521).
4. 122 S. Ct. at 2543 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor
paired her survey-derived evidence with anecdotal evidence about
the actual role of campaign contributions in influencing deci-
sions. 
5. Telephone numbers were generated by a random digit dial
process, which allowed access to all listed and unlisted phones.
The list was stratified by state.  Quotas were assigned to reflect the
percentage of households within these states.  The data were
weighted by gender, region, education, age, and race to ensure the
sample is an accurate reflection of the population.  Findings are
subject to a margin of error of +/- 3.1 percent.  To maximize the
number of questions that could be asked, some questions are
based on 500 respondents.  This increases the margin of error to
+/- 4.4 percent.  
The U.S. Supreme Court’s first decision on judicial elec-tions—Republican Party of Minnesota v. White1—came onthe heels of the first national opinion survey devoted
entirely to judicial selection issues.  In late 2001, 1,000 ran-
domly selected members of the public and 2,500 state appellate
and trial judges answered questions about their participation in
judicial elections, opinions about current practices, and sup-
port for various reform proposals.  Some questions were asked
of judges and public alike, while other questions concentrated
on their respective roles in the election process.  The surveys
were conducted on behalf of the Justice at Stake Campaign, a
nationwide coalition of legal and citizen organizations con-
cerned with preserving judicial independence.2
These surveys present a unique opportunity to evaluate
empirically some of the explicit and implicit assertions made by
respondents, lower courts, amici curiae, and the Supreme Court
justices concerning what the public thinks and wants, and how
judges experience campaigning and the canons.  Indeed, the
survey’s findings are a part of the record in the White decision.
One amicus brief (filed by the Brennan Center)3 and Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion cited the survey.  All references
are to survey questions about the influence of judicial campaign
fundraising.  Justice O’Connor noted that: 
Even if judges were able to refrain from favoring
donors, the mere possibility that judges’ decisions
may be motivated by the desire to repay campaign
contributors is likely to undermine the public’s confi-
dence in the judiciary. See Greenberg Quinlan Rosner
Research, Inc., and American Viewpoint, National
Public Opinion Survey Frequency Questionnaire 4
(2001), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/
files/JASNationalSurveyResuls.pdf) (describing sur-
vey results indicating that 76 percent of registered vot-
ers believe that campaign contributions influence
judicial decisions); id., at 7 (describing survey results
indicating that two-thirds of registered voters believe
individuals and groups who give money to judicial
candidates often receive favorable treatment).4
The surveys have more to say on the topic of campaign
fundraising by judges, and include questions that describe judi-
cial and voter behavior at election time.  Survey participants
were also asked to indicate their support for various proposals
for improving judicial elections.  
Other questions sought more abstract impressions of what it
means to be a judge.  The status of the judge as a politician was
a particular theme.  Questions ask how judges should campaign
and how judges compare to other public officials who run for
office. The survey thus allows some exploration of fundamen-
tal concerns about judicial independence and accountability.
The result is a complex image of judges.  Both judges and the
public hold equivocal views of where the judge as decision-
maker intersects with the judge as fundraiser and campaigner.  
THE SURVEY
The firm of Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Inc.
designed and administered the telephone survey of 1,000 ran-
domly selected sample of (self-identified) registered voters.
American Viewpoint, a survey firm with a largely Republican
client base, collaborated with Greenberg Quinlan, which has a
largely Democratic client base, to ensure bipartisanship in the
choice of questions and question wording.  Four focus groups
were used to fine-tune the questions.  The survey was con-
ducted October 30-November 7, 2001.5
The same collaboration carried out the separate, national
survey of state judges by mail from November 5, 2001 to
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6. The total judges’ sample is subject to a margin of error (MOE) of
+/- 2 percent, and each separate sample to a higher margin of error
(supreme court sample, MOE = +/- 7.2 percent; appellate sample,
MOE = +/- 4.3 percent; lower court sample, MOE = +/- 2.4 per-
cent).
7. See David B. Rottman & Roy A. Schotland, What Makes Judicial
Elections Unique?, 34 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1369 (2001) (quoting
Richard Woodbury, Is Texas Justice for Sale?, TIME, Jan. 11, 1998,
at 74 (noting that recent changes in judicial elections had made
them “noisier, nastier, and costlier”).
January 2, 2002.  Survey questionnaires were completed and
returned by 61 percent of the recipients, a strikingly high rate
of participation.6 The 2,428 participating judges included 188
state supreme court justices, 527 intermediate appellate court
judges, and 1,713 trial court judges.  Survey participants
include about one judge in ten.  
ASSERTIONS ABOUT WHAT 
JUDGES EXPERIENCE AS CANDIDATES 
The judge’s survey inquired about experiences as a candi-
date, preferences in terms of reform, evaluation of their state’s
canons, their view of the judicial role, and concerns about judi-
cial elections.  How judges respond is shown in tables and
charts.  Each table and chart repeats the exact wording of the
question.  The views of supreme court justices, intermediate
appellate court judges, and trial judges tend to be similar.  The
text notes instances where the world looked differently depend-
ing on the level of court a judge occupied.  
(1) Judicial elections today are “nastier, nosier, and costlier.”
“Nastier, nosier, and costlier” is a punchy description of how
judicial elections have changed in recent years.7 That change is
evident in a number of states, especially for supreme court
races.  A survey question asked the judges if they believe the
conduct and tone of judicial campaigns has changed over the
past 5 years (see Table 1). The majority of judges (61%) per-
ceive a decline in the conduct and tone of judicial campaigns
over the past 5 years.  Thirty percent of the judges saw no
change.  One judge in ten sensed an improvement.  
The responses suggest that concern over declining standards in
judicial campaign conduct is widespread, certainly present in
many states and at all court levels, but not universal. 
The survey also asked judges if they were satisfied with the
way judicial campaigns are conducted.  Despite the sense of
decline just noted, judges are evenly split between those satis-
fied and those dissatisfied with the conduct and tone of cam-
paigns (see Table 2).
(2) Judges are preoccupied with raising campaign funds.
It is recognized that in some states a viable judicial candi-
date, especially for a supreme court seat, must raise very large
sums of money.  The survey asked the judges if they felt under
pressure to raise campaign money (see Table 3).  Of judges run-
ning for election, 59% describe themselves as being under pres-
sure to raise money for their campaign during election years.
Most report being under “a great deal of pressure” (57% of
supreme court justices, 49% of intermediate appellate court
judges, and 40% of trial judges).  Few (only 10% for supreme
court justices) describe the pressure as “just a little” or “none at
all.”  Thus, it appears that the demands of fundraising are being
experienced throughout the judiciary.  
The survey strongly suggests the pressure to raise campaign
funds is pervasive, experienced by the majority of judges, both
trial and appellate.   
(3) Judges face public criticism from within and outside their
state.  
The majority of judges report having been publicly criticized
in their role of judge.  This was most often the case among
supreme court justices (76%) but common among intermediate
appellate court justices (54%) and trial judges (56%).  The sur-
vey asked participants to identify the source of the criticism (see
Table 4).  The media and within-state special interest groups
were the most frequent sources of criticism.  Other officials
ranked third as the most frequent critics.  Public criticism from
other judicial candidates was rare, even among supreme court
justices.  Nearly one-half of supreme court justices report
receiving criticism from special interest groups within their
state, as do about one-fourth of other judges.  Criticism from
national interest groups is less common but experienced by
about one in five supreme court justices.  Eighteen percent of
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TABLE 1
Do you think the conduct and tone of judicial campaigns 
has gotten better or worse over the past 5 years?
Much better 2 %
Somewhat better 7
Stayed the same 30
Somewhat worse 38
Much worse 23
Total 100 %
TABLE 2
How satisfied are you with the conduct 
and tone of judicial campaigns?
Very satisfied 14 %
Somewhat satisfied 39
Somewhat dissatisfied 31
Very dissatisfied 17
Total 100 %
TABLE 3
If under pressure to raise money:  
How much pressure are you under to raise money for your
campaign during election years?
Intermediate 
Supreme Court Appellate Trial
Great deal 57% 49 % 40%
Some 33 32 40
Just a little 3 6 7
None at all 7 14 13
100% 100 % 100%
8. The question read, “If yes, what are the two most important reasons
that you held back or felt restrained in responding to criticism?”  
supreme court justices, 5% of intermediate appellate judges,
and 3% of trial judges reported criticism from national special
interest groups.  
(4) The canons restrict the ability of judicial candidates to
counter speech with more speech.  
The overwhelming majority (89%) of judges who had been
criticized felt that they “held back or felt restrained” in respond-
ing.  The canons were the most frequently cited reason for
restraint, mentioned by 73% of those reporting criticism.8 The
other commonly cited reasons were “a personal belief that
judges should not respond” (cited by 43%) and “the criticism
wasn’t worthy of a response” (34%).
Another question sought an evaluation of the impact of the
canons on judicial behavior.  The response varied by type of
court:  51% of supreme court justices, 60% of intermediate
appellate judges, and 71% of trial judges agreed with the state-
ment (see Table 5).  It appears that supreme court justices are
subject to more criticism than judges at other levels but are less
concerned with restrictions imposed by the canons.  
The sense of being restrained does not necessarily indicate a
desire to weaken or even change the canons.  Most judges at all
levels felt that their state’s code contained the right amount and
type of restrictions (see Table 6).
Judges who feel their state’s canons are too restrictive greatly
outnumber those who perceive too few restrictions.  Yet most
judges—nearly two-thirds—view the canons as being of the
right amount and type.  
(5) Judges place boundaries on their own campaign behavior. 
The survey identifies some areas in which nearly all judges
believe a judicial candidate cannot stray.  One question dealt
with the “pledge or promise” provision in many canons, unaf-
fected by the White decision.  Judges were asked how strongly
they support or oppose the following statement:  “Judicial can-
didates should never make promises during elections about
how they will rule in cases that may come before them.”
Strong support was offered by 97% of the judges.  Only a hand-
ful (out of nearly 2,500 judge participants) strongly opposed
the statement.  
Another area was examined in a question that sought the
degree of support for the proposition, “Judicial candidates
should commit to not making misleading or unfair accusations
about opponents during elections.”  Strong support came from
93% of the judges surveyed.
For the most part, supreme court, intermediate appellate
judges, and trial judges reported similar experiences and
expressed similar opinions.  A striking finding is the perva-
siveness of pressure to raise funds and public criticism.  The
relatively small number of high-profile supreme court races
tells only a part of the story of how judicial elections are being
conducted. 
WHAT THE PUBLIC THINKS AND WANTS
The telephone survey of the public included more questions
than the postal survey completed by judges.  A wide range of
topics was covered.  These include the record of voting for
judicial candidates, evaluations of judges, courts, and other
organizations, concerns over judicial selection and decision
making, and preferences among various reform proposals.
Most topics were approached through several types of ques-
tions, enriching what the survey findings can tell us.  The ben-
efit of such a multifaceted approach comes in what we can
learn about core issues like whether being elected makes a
judge a politician in the same sense as legislators and gover-
nors.  
(1) Judges are politicians . . . .
One survey question took a direct approach to the issue of
whether judges are politicians.  The survey participants were
read a series of words and phrases that people use to describe
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TABLE 4
Have you ever been publicly criticized in your role as judge
by any of the following individuals or groups?
Intermediate 
Supreme Court Appellate Trial
The media 56% 34 % 38%
Special interest 
group in state 46 24 22
Other public 
official 38 18 20
Other judicial 
candidate 23 9 11
National special 
interest group 18 5 3
TABLE 5
Do you feel that your state’s Code of Judicial Conduct 
prevents judges from adequately responding to unfair or 
misleading criticism of decisions?
Intermediate 
Supreme Court Appellate Trial
Yes 51% 60 % 71%
No 49 40 29
Total 100% 100 % 100%
TABLE 6
Do you feel that your state’s Code of Judicial Conduct 
contains too many restrictions on judicial campaign speech,
too few restrictions, or the right amount and type of 
restrictions on judicial campaign speech?
The right amount and type 64 %
Too many restrictions? 30
Too few restrictions. 6
100 %
9. Other proportions of “very well” responses include “indepen-
dent” (13%), “honest and trustworthy” (14%), and “qualified”
(24%).  It is possible that the context provided by earlier survey
questions heightened sensitivity to the role of judge as political
candidate.
10. The information contained in the statement might be seen as
making the case for treating judges as different.  Other questions,
however, use wording that might be seen as arguing in the oppo-
site direction.
11. That statement was read to one half of the survey participants.
The other half was read a statement that ended with, “We must
take concrete steps to ensure that judges are shielded from exces-
sive partisan political pressure that other public officials face.”
The majority of respondents found that a convincing argument,
but to a lesser degree than for the notion of judges as free to make
judges and then asked to say how well each describes judges
(the choices were “very well,” “well,” “not too well,” and “not
well at all”).  “Political” was included in the list.  Most survey
participants felt that “political” describes judges “very well”
(34%) or “well” (44%). Only 4% felt “political” describes
judges “not well at all.”  The identification of judge with
“political” is striking because of the 12 words and phrases
(including “impartial,” “committed to the public interest,”
and “qualified”) that were tested, “political” attracted the
largest proportion of describes “very well” responses.9
(2) But judges are a special kind of politician.
Although judges are seen as “political,” it may be that the
public attaches some caveats that distinguish judges from
executive and legislative branch officials.  Other questions pur-
sued the meaning of political in the judicial context through an
abstract approach, addressing concerns such as judicial inde-
pendence.  One question of that kind involved a statement:
Judges should be treated differently than other
public officials since they must make independent
decisions about what the law says.  Judges should
not have to raise money like politicians, make cam-
paign promises like politicians, or answer to special
interests.  We must take concrete steps to ensure that
judges can make unpopular decisions based only on
the facts and the law.10
Respondents were asked if they found the statement very
convincing, somewhat convincing, a little convincing, or not
at all convincing. Eighty-two percent found the statement
either very convincing (52%) or somewhat convincing
(30%).11
A less wordy, but again somewhat abstract approach to pub-
lic sentiment on the uniqueness of the judiciary was taken by
asking survey participants to choose between a pair of state-
ments.  One statement describes courts as institutions that
should be free of political and public pressure and the other
posits that courts are just like other institutions and thus
should not be free of those pressures (see Table 7).  Survey par-
ticipants were asked to say which statement is closer to their
own view.  
The responses suggest the public sees the judiciary as
unique, rather than similar to other institutions.  Eighty-one
percent opt for the statement that courts are unique.  
The survey finds that the public image of the courts and
judges contains a strong political component.  The image also
contains a strong sense that the judicial branch is unique.  Such
ambiguities and complexities are characteristic of public opin-
ion on the courts and generally.  Consistency is not the most
prominent feature of public opinion. 
(3) Judicial elections damage the public standing of the judi-
ciary.
As Justice O’Connor noted, a considerable majority of
Americans express concern over judges as campaign fundrais-
ers.  Does that concern translate into lower levels of trust in
courts and judges?  The survey evidence suggests that it might.
Survey participants were asked, “How much trust and confi-
dence do you have in courts and judges in your state?”  The
response choices offered to survey participants were “a great
deal” (25%), “some” (53%), “just a little” (16%), or “none at
all” (5%). 
Whether people believe campaign fundraising influences
judges is related to their trust in the courts (see Chart 1).  “A
great deal” of trust in the courts is expressed by 16% of partic-
ipants who perceive “a great deal” of influence from campaign
fundraising and by 40% of those who see no influence from
campaign contributions.12
There is a statistically significant relationship between con-
cern over fundraising and trust in the courts.  The relationship
is negative because the greater the concern over contributions,
the lower the twist.  Statistical significance gives us confidence
that even if we asked the same questions of another group of
1,000 randomly selected adults, the relationship of perceived
influence with trust would be about the same.  
The strength of the relationship between perceived influence
TABLE 7
Courts are unique institutions of government that should
be free of political and public pressure.
Courts are just like other institutions of government and
should not be free of political and public pressure.
First statement much more convincing 62 %
First statement somewhat more convincing 19
Second statement somewhat more convincing 10
Second statement much more convincing 9
100 %
unpopular decisions.  Overall, 73% of respondents found the
statement on partisanship convincing (split evenly between very
and somewhat so).  
12. Other recent surveys confirm the public’s unease with judges as
campaign fundraisers and the association between that unease
and levels of trust in the courts.  Relevant surveys include
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE
SYSTEM (1999) and NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE
PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY (1999).
Reports on both surveys have appeared in previous issues of Court
Review.  See An Interview with Phil Anderson and Marilyn Goldman,
COURT REVIEW, Winter 1998, at 8; and David B. Rottman & Alan
J. Tomkins, Public Trust and Confidence in the Courts:  What Public
Opinion Surveys Mean to Judges, COURT REVIEW, Fall 1999, at 24.
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and trust is measured separately.  That relationship is weak.
Here, we measured how well knowing a person’s views  about
campaign fundraising correlates with their evaluation of the
judiciary.  A score of 1.0 indicates a perfect relationship—if you
know how a person feels about campaign fundraising, you can
exactly predict their trust in the courts.  A score of zero means
knowing a person’s view on fundraising tells us nothing about
their level of trust.  The correlation between the influence and
trust is on the low side:  -.21.13
While those who disapprove of fundraising by judges are less
likely to trust the courts, that is only a small part of a much
larger story.  There is no reason to single out campaign fundrais-
ing as looming larger in importance to the public than other
issues related to the role and performance of the judiciary. 
(4) Voters fail to participate in judicial elections because they
lack adequate information to choose among the candidates.
The survey offers some support for the belief that a lack of
information on the candidates is a factor underlying the reluc-
tance to participate in judicial elections.  First, the survey con-
firms the relatively low amount of information potential voters
have on judicial candidates (see Table 8).  
The public divides evenly between those who have at least
“some” information and those who have “just a little” or less
information.  
Second, the survey measures the relatively low rate of voter
participation in judicial elections (see Table 9).  
The survey provides two benchmarks to compare voting in
judicial elections to the rates in other types of elections.  Eighty-
seven percent of participants said they had voted in the 2000
presidential election.  When asked to look ahead to the 2002
congressional elections, 72% said they were “almost certain” to
vote, 18% said they would probably vote, and 8% gave the prob-
ability as 50-50.  Three percent said they did not think they
would vote.   The survey findings are consistent with actual vot-
ing percentages. 14 There is a voter “roll-off” in which voters
who cast ballots for “top-of-the-ticket” races like those for gov-
ernor, but fail to vote in any judicial election.15
The most commonly offered reason survey participants give
for not voting is that they “don’t know enough about the candi-
dates” (cited by 18% of the survey participants).  “Don’t have
time” was the second most common answer (cited by 11% of
participants).  
Third, those who claim possession of a great deal of informa-
tion are more likely to vote in judicial elections (see Chart 2).
Those claiming possession of “a great deal” of candidate infor-
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13. The statistic is Spearman’s rho, a measure of the strength of the
relationship between two variables appropriate for ordinal data
(where responses to a question go from high to low but at inter-
vals that are not fixed).  For example, we do not know if in a
response to a question asking about support for, say, merit selec-
tion, the distance between strongly support and somewhat sup-
port is the same as the distance between somewhat support and
somewhat oppose.   
14. It is likely that there is some exaggeration of frequency with
which participants actually vote in judicial elections.  Survey
responses can be affected by what people think they should do.
An indirect measure of voting can be obtained from the survey.
About one in four (38%) survey respondents said they “always
vote” in response to the question of why they did not vote in judi-
cial elections.  This compares with the 59% who stated that they
“almost always vote” in judicial races.  According to the U.S.
Census, 86% of registered voters cast their ballot for President in
2000.  Press Release, Bureau of the Census, Registered Voter
Turnout Improved in 2000 Presidential Election, Census Bureau
Reports (Feb. 27, 2002), available at http://www.census.gov/
Press-Release/www/2002/cb02-31.html.
15. Roll-off rates during the 1990s ranged from 15% to 25% in reten-
tion elections (Florida), 33% to 42% in nonpartisan elections
(Washington state), and 8% to 14% in partisan elections (Texas).
Straight-party votes are more responsible for the low roll-offs
found in partisan elections than the excitement generated by con-
tested, hard-fought campaigns.  Charles H. Sheldon & Linda S.
Maule, CHOOSING JUSTICE:  THE RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL
JUDGES 63, 83, 143 (1999).
16%
52%
23%
29%
55%
13%
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55%
10%
40%
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9%
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A Little
Some
Great Deal
Great Deal Some A Little None
CHART 1
Level of Trust in the Courts by Perceived Influence of 
Money on Judicial Decisions
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TABLE 8
Thinking back to the last time there was an election for
judges in your state, how much information would you say
you had about the candidates in those election?  
A great deal of information 13 %
Some information 38
Just a little information 35
No information at all 14
100 %
TABLE 9
Thinking specifically about judicial elections, how frequently
do you vote in elections for judges?  
Almost always 59 %
Sometimes 17
Not often 6
Almost never 16
100 %
mation claim that they almost always vote in judicial elections.
Among potential voters with no candidate information, only
one in four report being “almost always” likely to vote.  
Having information on judicial candidates is related to the
extent to which people take an active interest in political life
generally.  Survey participants were asked if contributed money
to political parties or candidates.  About 40% were contributing
and they claimed greater knowledge about judicial candidates
and about how the courts work.  Being a campaign contributor
is related to a person’s education.  Concern over influence of
campaign contributions, however, was the same among political
contributors and noncontributors.  
(5) The public is unwilling to give up the right to vote in the judi-
cial selection process.
The public prefers to elect judges despite a lack of informa-
tion about the candidates, concern about campaign fundraising
by judges, and low rates of voter participation in judicial elec-
tions.  The preference to vote emerges clearly from the responses
survey participants gave when offered a direct choice (see Table
10).  The question offered two statements about how judges
should be selected and asked which they found the most con-
vincing.  
Spring 2002 - Court Review 21
Elected judges were preferred to appointed judges.  The first
statement was closer to the views of 80% of respondents.  
(6) The public values judicial accountability.
Two questions, one on public criticism and the other on free
speech, provide insight into the public’s thinking about the
appropriate balance between judicial independence and
accountability.  The question on public criticism took the form
of paired statements. Participants indicate which statement is
the more convincing (see Table 11).
Two-thirds of the public survey respondents were convinced
by the notion that criticism is conducive to accountability.  Few
saw criticism as intimidation.
Another survey question used a more abstract form of words
to investigate the importance placed on judicial accountability
relative to other considerations.  A statement was read and the
participants were asked to say how convincing they found it to
be (see Table 12).
The response to the statement is mixed.  The statement con-
vinces the majority of respondents.  The balance was tipped
toward the side of “somewhat” rather than “very” convincing. 
Overall, the public is equivocal in how it views the judiciary.
On the one hand, it appears to see judges as political and to
desire that judges be held accountable through the electoral
process.  On the other hand, it regards judges as different from
other elected officials.  Somehow campaign funding by a judi-
cial candidate is qualitatively different that fundraising by a leg-
16. The balance weighed less in favor of elections when it was paired
against “Judges in my state should be initially appointed to office,
then voters should have a chance to decide whether the judge
stays in office.”  Fifty-four percent favored the first statement and
42% the second.  
TABLE 10
Judges in my state should be elected to office.
Judges in my state should be appointed to office.  
First statement much more convincing 63 %
First statement somewhat more convincing 18
Second statement somewhat more convincing 8
Second statement much more convincing 12
Total     100 %
TABLE 11
Public criticism of judges makes judges more accountable
and leads to better decisions.  
Public criticism of judges often intimidates them and
leads to worse decisions.  
First statement much more convincing 39 %
First statement somewhat more convincing 31
Second statement somewhat more convincing 19
Second statement much more convincing 12
Total     100 %
TABLE 12
Our courts and judges must be accountable to the people.  
So-called reforms that limit the ability of citizens to educate
others about the decisions of judges are a fundamental assault
on the Constitution.  People who say they’re out to reform the
system are really just trying to take away your right to vote. 
Very convincing 26 %
Somewhat convincing 36
A little convincing 19
Not at all convincing 19
Total     100 %
82%
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14%
54%
23%
25%
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44%
Almost Never
Not Often
Sometimes
Almost Always
Great Deal Some A Little None
CHART 2
Likelihood of Voting in Judicial Elections 
by Information About Candidate
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islative or executive candidate.  Perhaps the public image of the
judiciary contains the elements that many groups and individu-
als concerned with the White case sought to reconcile.  
(7) The public and the judges disagree on how judges should be
selected.
The surveys identify some points of agreement and disagree-
ment in the priorities of judges and the public for improving
judicial elections.  That difference may be related to a funda-
mental divergence in the opinions of judges and public.  Judges
give themselves high marks, while the public gives far lower
marks to the quality of the job being done by the courts in their
state (see Chart 3).  A judge is seven times more likely than
members of the public to rate courts and judges as doing an
excellent job (35% versus 5%).  The public is evenly split
between those holding positive and negative views of the judi-
ciary, while 96% of judges describe the courts as doing an excel-
lent or good job.  
Such a fundamental difference is likely to color how each
group approaches the topic of judicial selection.  
The gap between what the public and judges think is also
found in the question of whether campaign contributions influ-
ence judges’ decisions.  The public’s assessment of the impact
campaign contributions made to judges have on their decisions
is at odds with the judiciary’s view (see Chart 4).  Thirty-eight
percent of the public and 5% of the judges surveyed attribute “a
great deal of influence” to campaign contributions.  
Eight specific reform proposals were presented to judges and
the general public (see Table 13).  The reaction to five of the pro-
posals was roughly similar among judges and the public.  Most
proposals were either strongly or somewhat supported by
judges and the public alike.  
There were two main points of difference.  First, the public is
more supportive than judges of proposals that would bring
more information or more public participation into the judicial
election process.  This is particularly true of voters’ guides that
would provide a standard source of information on candidates
(51% of judges and 72% of the public strongly agreed with that
proposal). There is also greater public support for establishing
independent citizen boards to inform the public about mislead-
ing advertising in judicial campaigns.  These are differences in
degree.  Both proposals receive support (“strong” or “some-
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42%
38%
14%
28%
23%
43%
No influence
at all
Just a little
influence
Some 
influence
A great deal
of influence
Public Judges
How much influence do you think 
campaign contributions made to 
judges have on their decisions?
6%
5%
45%
37%
35%
59%
Poor
Just Fair
Good
Excellent
Public Judges
How would you rate the job being done
by courts and judges in your state?
CHART 3
CHART 4
12%
5%
5%
TABLE 13
EIGHT REFORM PROPOSALS:  
SUPPORT BY JUDGES AND PUBLIC
A series of proposals have been made to help improve the
way we elect judges.  For each one, please mark whether you
strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or
strongly oppose the proposal.  
Proportion Giving 
Strong Support
Public Judges
States should provide voter guides prior 72 % 51 %
to judicial elections to help inform voters 
about the candidates in each race
States should require that all judicial 72 80
candidates disclose the individuals, 
parties, or organizations who donate 
money to their campaigns
States should require that all political 74 87
advertisements in judicial elections 
clearly state who is paying for the ad
Independent citizen boards should be 56 45
established to inform the public about 
misleading or inaccurate advertising in
judicial campaigns
States should limit campaign contributions 55 45
to judicial candidates
Judges should be prohibited from presiding 68 35
over and ruling in cases when one of the
sides has given money to their campaign 
Judicial candidates should condemn 60 83
negative or misleading advertising done 
on their behalf  
Judicial candidates should commit to not 72 93
making misleading or unfair accusations 
about opponents during elections
what”) from a sizable majority of judges and members of the
public.  
The second point of difference is in the behavior of judges in
relation to or in response to campaigning.  Judges are stronger
supporters of a proposal that judicial candidates should con-
demn negative or misleading advertising done on their 83% per-
cent of judges and 60% of the public gave “strong support” to
that proposal.  
The sharpest difference between judges and the public is
about a prohibition on presiding over cases in which one of the
sides contributed to their election campaign. The public was
more supportive than judges of the proposal that “Judges should
be prohibited from presiding over and ruling in cases when one
of the sides has given money to their campaign” (see Chart 5).
Two-thirds of the public but only one-third of judges strongly
support a prohibition on presiding over cases when one side has
given money to a judge’s campaign.  Even so, a majority of
judges (61%) gave either some or strong support to that pro-
posal.  The public was also more supportive of establishing
independent citizen boards to inform the public about mislead-
ing or inaccurate advertising in judicial campaigns.  
A majority of both judges and the public agreed that “[j]udi-
cial candidates should commit to not making misleading or
unfair accusations about opponents during elections.” 
(8) The judicial selection reform agenda is divisive.  
Although the public and judges responded similarly to some
specific proposals for improving judicial elections, their views
diverged when it came to assessing merit selection.  Both judge
and public survey respondents were given a summary of a pro-
posal based on the merit selection model:  a nonpartisan citizen
panel evaluates and then recommends a slate of potential
judges to the governor, who selects a nominee for confirmation
by the state legislature.  If confirmed, subsequent terms are
secured through retention elections.  The proposal receives
substantial support from the public but a less positive reaction
from intermediate appellate and trial court judges, who are
evenly split on the supporting and opposing positions.
Supreme court justices have a distinctive reaction to the pro-
posal: one-third strongly support and one-third strongly
oppose merit selection, with an overall majority (59%) in sup-
port (see Chart 6).  This is one of the instances in which the
level of court is related to a judge’s opinions about judicial
selection.  
CONCLUSION
The survey data challenge some assertions made in connec-
tion with the White case and support other assertions. Both chal-
lenges and support often come with clarification or modifica-
tion.  
There is support for the depiction of judicial election cam-
paigns as “nastier, nosier, and costlier” than before.  The strik-
ing finding from the judges’ survey is the extent to which con-
cern over elections and campaign fundraising activity is so per-
vasive.  Concern is not limited to the small number of states that
have made the news.  It is also not limited to supreme court
races. Still, public criticism by other candidates or by national
interest groups is infrequent.  
The data also support the claim that the canons restrict
responses to criticism.  However, there is no consensus among
judges that such restrictions need to be loosened. The majority
of judges believe that the existing canons in their state are just
right.  
The survey also suggests that there is a commitment on the
part of virtually all judges to keep judicial elections different.
Pledges or promises are viewed as improper, as is a commitment
to make misleading or unfair accusations against potential
opponents.  
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13%
68%
8%
35%
26%
23%
18%Strongly
oppose
Somewhat
oppose
Somewhat
support
Strongly
support
Public Judges
Judges should be prohibited from presiding over
and ruling in cases where one of the sides has
given money to their campaign.
12%
CHART 5
CHART 6
32%
31%
21%
25%
16%
27%
37%
20%
29%
15%
36%
38%
34%
10%
18%
Supreme Intermediate Trial Public
Here is a summary of a proposal that deals with the
way judges are selected.
Under this proposal, a nonpartisan panel of citizens,
legal professionals, and civic leaders evaluates and rec-
ommends potential judges to the governor.  The governor
then chooses a nominee from the list who must then be
confirmed by the state legislature.  After each term, the
public then votes on whether a judge should keep the seat
or be removed from office.  If a judge is rejected, the selec-
tion process starts again.
Based on this statement, would you strongly support,
somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly
oppose such a proposal?
Strongly
oppose
Somewhat
oppose
Somewhat
support
Strongly
support
8%
17. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research,
in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 229, 233-34 (2d ed.
2000).
18. The response rate is on the high end of what is typical in postal
surveys administered to judges.  The rate is notable in that the
surveys were mailed in the immediate aftermath of September 11,
2001.  Other surveys have produced response rates ranging from
14% (Randall D. Lloyd, et al., An Exploration of State and Local
Judge Mobility, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 19, 26-27 (2001) (on contests to
judicial authority)), 33% (Rita James Simon, Judges’ Translations
of Burdens of Proof into Statements of Probability, 13 TRIAL LAW.
GUIDE 103 (1969) (on defining reasonable doubt)); and 41%
(Gordon Bazemore & Leslie Leip, Victim Participation in the New
Juvenile Court:  Tracking Judicial AttitudesToward Restorative Justice
Reforms, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 199, 205 (2000) (on juvenile court
judges)).  The importance of the topic to the judges surveyed is
an important factor in determining the response rate.
Other assertions attracted mixed or limited support.  Judges
are viewed as political, but generally the public comes down on
the side of respecting the unique responsibilities of the judicial
branch.  If judges are politicians, they are a very special kind of
politician.  The public wants judges to be subject to criticism
but generally supports provisions that modify the election
process to be appropriate for judicial office.  The survey pro-
vides grounds for viewing with caution the desire expressed in
this and other surveys to elect, not appoint judges.  The public
has an equivocal view of judges.  The various pieces forming
that view do not fit into a coherent whole. 
Voters in judicial elections are poorly informed; voters
acknowledge the limited information that they possess.  Voters
do not believe, however, that they are bereft of any information.
About one-half of registered voters report knowing at least
something about the judicial candidates in the last election. 
The public is more supportive than the judiciary of reforms
that will bring more information into judicial elections.  The
public is more persuaded than judges of the merits of efforts
like voters’ guides and campaign oversight committees.  At the
same time, the public is less convinced of the need for judicial
candidates to condemn misleading advertising done on their
behalf.  It is notable, however, that a reform agenda for judicial
elections attracts very substantial support among judges and
the public. 
Both of the surveys were professionally done and should
meet accepted tests for acceptance by the courts.  Under Rule
703 of the Federal Rule of Evidence, survey findings are
allowed as a basis for expert opinion when they “are of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions.”  For survey results, the specific standard
may be stated this way: “Was the poll or survey constructed in
accordance with generally accepted principles, and were the
results used in a statistically correct way.”17
Here, both surveys meet that standard.  The judges’ survey is
unique in its authoritativeness.  Nearly one of every ten serving
American state judges participated.  The high rate of participa-
tion by judges is strong testimony on the topicality of judicial
selection.18
The public survey is unique in being devoted to the topic of
judicial selection.  The breadth and depth of its coverage gives
it considerable value.  
Perhaps the most striking finding from the public opinion
survey is the equivocal view people hold of judges and the judi-
ciary.  In some ways, this is to be expected.  Public thinking
about the judiciary is inchoate.  It is full of inconsistencies and
not well grounded in knowledge or experience.  That does not
mean, however, that public opinion is without substance or
importance.  The American public is shaky on the details but
gets the gist of our system.  They acknowledge that judges are
political, but consider them a unique sort of politician, ones
who play within a different set of rules than legislative or exec-
utive branch elected officials when campaigning.
David B. Rottman is associate director of
research at the National Center for State Courts,
where he has worked since 1987. He has a Ph.D.
in sociology from the University of Illinois at
Urbana. Rottman previously was a senior
researcher at the Economic and Social Research
Institute in Dublin, Ireland.  While in Dublin, he
was appointed to official commissions on prison
reform and on welfare reform.  His current interests include the
pros and cons of specialized courts, therapeutic jurisprudence,
minority group perceptions of the courts, and approaches to civil
justice reform. He is the coauthor of books on the development of
modern Ireland, social class, and community courts.
24 Court Review - Spring 2002
THE AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION
• an independent organization of judges at all levels of the judiciary in the United States, Canada, and Mexico
• a professional association providing a voice and leadership for judges, working with governments and other entities
• a national association communicating with the public about issues of concern to judges
• a source of up-to-date information on issues affecting judges through quarterly issues of Court Review, the leading journal for judges
• a presenter of annual educational conferences featuring top-notch speakers in locations such as Hawaii, Seattle, New Orleans, and
Toronto
• a leader in organizing judges to attack critical issues, such as domestic violence, court security, public trust and confidence in the
courts, and judicial independence
• your place to be apprised of national issues affecting the courts and to participate in discussions and projects with judges from the
United States, Canada, and Mexico
See us on the web at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/.
